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A B S T R A C T
There is ongoing discussion in forensic science and the law about the nature of the conclusions reached
based on scientiﬁc evidence, and on how such conclusions – and conclusion criteria – may be justiﬁed by
rational argument. Examples, among others, are encountered in ﬁelds such as ﬁngermarks (e.g., ‘this ﬁn-
germark comes from Mr. A’s left thumb’), handwriting examinations (e.g., ‘the questioned signature is that
of Mr. A’), kinship analyses (e.g., ‘Mr. A is the father of child C’) or anthropology (e.g., ‘these are human
remains’). Considerable developments using formal methods of reasoning based on, for example (Bayesian)
decision theory, are available in literature, but currently such reference principles are not explicitly used
in operational forensic reporting and ensuing decision-making. Moreover, applied examples, illustrating
the principles, are scarce. A potential consequence of this in practical proceedings, and hence a cause of
concern, is that underlying ingredients of decision criteria (such as losses quantifying the undesirability of
adverse decision consequences), are not properly dealt with. There is merit, thus, in pursuing the study and
discussion of practical examples, demonstrating that formal decision-theoretic principles are not merely
conceptual considerations. Actually, these principles can be shown to underpin practical decision-making
procedures and existing legal decision criteria, though often not explicitly apparent as such. In this paper,
we will present such examples and discuss their properties from a Bayesian decision-theoretic perspec-
tive. We will argue that these are essential concepts for an informed discourse on decision-making across
forensic disciplines and the development of a coherent view on this topic. We will also emphasize that
these principles are of normative nature in the sense that they provide standards against which actual judg-
ment and decision-makingmay be compared. Most importantly, these standards are justiﬁed independently
of peoples’ observable decision behaviour, and of whether or not one endorses these formal methods of
reasoning.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd on behalf of The Chartered Society of Forensic
Sciences. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
1. Introduction
What degree of personal belief should be required before decid-
ing in favour of a particular option? This question is fundamental and
arises recurrently. It is inevitable not only in many situations of daily
life, but also in virtually any professional area of activity (e.g., eco-
nomics, engineering, and medicine) [e.g., 19]. In legal contexts, the
question of decision takes a highly visible position, mainly because of
the direct impact that convictions and acquittals have on all parties
involved in the legal process. The ultimate issue is only one decision
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point, however, among many others in the legal process. Some of
those decisions relate to scientiﬁc evidence presented by forensic
scientists, as will be exempliﬁed later in this paper. Other decision
points relate to questions such as whether or not to hear a particular
witness, or whether or not to conduct a search.
On a broad view, there are several ways to deal with decision-
making. One is dismissively, often justiﬁed by reasons such as the
need for practically feasible procedures or limitations of resources
(e.g., time). Such an approach may be paired with trust in personal
experience or a preference for intuitive proceedings. Indeed, there
are many day-to-day situations in which a decision must be made
and where spending too much time on introspection is neither nec-
essary nor desirable. But there are also other situations in which it
is appropriate to formalise intuition – as an integral part of logical
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.scijus.2017.07.002
1355-0306/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd on behalf of The Chartered Society of Forensic Sciences. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
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reasoning in the face of uncertainty – and devote time to a seri-
ous analysis of how to make a decision, so as to guarantee that
throughout decision analysis one is able to measure the quality of
decisions [6]. This is typically the case when the stakes involved are
high, or adverse decision consequences are severe. One very well
knownway to look at these different decision perspectives is through
Kahneman’s notion of fast and slow thinking [17]. In this paper, we
posit that professional decision analysis related to the evaluative use
of forensic science results in the legal context provides a strong case
for the introspective approach.
Once it is agreed that questions of decision ought to be
approached through an in-depth perspective, practicing and aca-
demic decision analysts commonly distinguish – in law as in
other disciplines – between two main accounts, the normative and
descriptive [e.g., [5]].1 The descriptive account takes an interest in
people’s observable decisional and judgmental behavior. The norma-
tive account considers, instead, the rational standards bywhich judg-
ment and decisions ought to be evaluated. Naturally, the descriptive
approach is strongly rooted in empirical considerations. Over the
past decades, there has been abundant research on, for example,
the elicitation of what various subjects (e.g., judges, citizens and
students) consider as ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ (e.g., [11,26], for a
review see also Ref. [14]). Quantitative values obtained in such stud-
ies, using various elicitation procedures, vary over a broad range,
depending on the experimental conditions. Such general knowledge
about the observable properties of human behavior with respect to
questions of judgment and decision is valuable, but the more fun-
damental question is what one’s required level of personal degree
of belief, before making a particular decision, actually means from a
logical point of view. This is a question that pertains to the norma-
tive domain [9] and will be a main focus of attention in this paper.
Wewill identify here the normative standpoint in terms of the classic
decision-theoretic account, also known as Bayesian decision theory,
given by probability and utility theory. Speciﬁcally, we will exem-
plify how this account allows one to capture the essential features of
existing forensic decision procedures and conclusion schemes.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces notation
and one of the forms in which the Bayesian decision-theoretic crite-
rion can be stated. The format we choose is based on the notion of
loss for qualifying decision consequences. It is our preferred choice
for the purpose of this paper because, compared to other formats,
it helps to break down some of the formulaic burden. Further tech-
nicalities are conﬁned to the Appendix. Section 3 will exemplify
how the criterion allows one to clarify the preferences among deci-
sion consequences that are implied by current decision thresholds
as used, for example, in kinship analyses in different legal systems.
We will also discuss these insights and their relevance for decision
practices in other areas of forensic science, such as ﬁngermarks and
comparative handwriting examinations. In Section 4, wewill empha-
size the prescriptive value of the approach. By prescriptive value we
mean the potential to provide incentives and means for improving
the practical understanding of how to decide based on forensic sci-
ence results, and how to ensure coherence between decision policies
across different forensic disciplines.
2. The Bayesian decision criterion
The basic tenet of the Bayesian decision-theoretic approach is –
in one of its formulations – the weighing of losses, quantifying the
undesirability of wrong decisions, with one’s personal probabilities
for such outcomes. In the legal context, typical examples for adverse
1 From a philosophical perspective, we may add the interpretive account, which
concentrates on, for example, the meaning of decision [10].
decision outcomes are the conviction of an innocent person or the
acquittal of person who is actually the offender. It is readily seen
that such consequences parallel with false identiﬁcations and exclu-
sions in the context of forensic identiﬁcation (or, individualization)
[e.g., 7]. More generally, an outcome is deﬁned as what would occur
if one makes a decision (e.g., convicting or acquitting, identifying or
excluding) given that a particular state of nature holds (e.g., the pros-
ecution’s or the defense’s case being true). When expressing losses
for decision outcomes numerically, and combining them with prob-
abilities for states of nature, one obtains to the concept of expected
loss. Decisions can be characterized by their expected loss, and one
can use expected loss as a basis to choose among available decisions.
In Bayesian decision theory, a common principle says to choose the
decision with minimum expected loss.2 The use of this principle, in
a prescriptive sense, as a basis for decision is controversial in the law
[e.g., [2]], a topic that is beyond the scope of this paper. Here we will
solely concentrate on the analytical use of this principle for the study
and review of decision problems that arise in the restricted scope of
forensic science.
The concept of expected loss is considered here because, at the
time when a decision must be made, the actual state of nature is
not known — it is uncertain. If it would be known which state of
nature holds, it would be straightforward to select the decision that
is optimal under that state of nature, and there would be no neces-
sity to approach the decision problem in a structured way. Clearly,
for example, if one would know for sure that a person of interest is
not the source of a trace found at a crime scene, not identifying that
person as the source of the trace would be the optimal decision. If,
however, there is uncertainty about the actual state of nature, the
presumably sensible way to proceed is to consider the loss that is
expected for each decision (e.g. considering the loss due to a missed
individualization and the loss due to a false identiﬁcation), and then
choose the decision which has the minimum expected loss. Further
development of the comparison of the expected losses of two deci-
sions, call them d1 and d2, leads to the following standard decision
criterion [e.g., [6]] (see Appendix):
decide d1 rather than d2 if and only if
Pr(h1 | I)




where h1 and h2 are the two states of nature (e.g., the competing
propositions of the prosecution and defense), Pr( • | I) denotes prob-
ability conditioned on information I, and L( • ) denotes loss associated
with a particular consequence Cij, that is the consequence of deciding
di (i = 1, 2) when the actual state of nature is hj ( j = 1, 2). Notice that
Eq. (1) supposes that correct conclusions, that is deciding d1 when
proposition h1 is true, and deciding d2 when proposition h2 is true,
have zero losses.3 In turn, the decisions with adverse consequences
C12, that is wrongly deciding d1 when in fact h2 holds, and C21, that is
wrongly deciding d2 when in fact h1 holds, have non-zero losses.
A crucial insight of the decision criterion that is exempliﬁed in
Eq. (1) is that the question of ‘what to decide’ does not have an abso-
lute answer, but a relative one. It is relative in the sense that one’s
degrees of belief, expressed in terms of the odds in favour of h1 over
h2, must be compared against the ratio of the relative losses associ-
ated with the two possible ways of deciding wrongly. In particular,
the prior (posterior) odds ratio on the left-hand side of Eq. (1) must
2 Note that one can also work with utilities instead of losses. Then the criterion
states that one should choose a decision that maximizes the expected utility.
3 Note that the approach is ﬂexible enough to consider, if required, variations to the
assumption that the two correct decision consequences have identical losses. Stated
otherwise, the decision-maker may consider that the results of the two ways of decid-
ing correctly are not equally desirable. However, in such a case, the reader should
observe Eq. (2) in the Appendix instead of the simpliﬁed Eq. (1) in Section 2.
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exceed the loss ratio on the right-hand side of Eq. (1), given by the
loss of the erroneous decision d1 when h2 is true, L(C12), and the loss
of the erroneous decision d2 when h1 is the case, L(C21). While this is
an abstract statement of a formulaic expression, with no guidance as
to how to quantify the various terms, the key question thus arising
is how to substantiate and exemplify Eq. (1) with respect to practical
instances of forensic decisions. Addressing this question is the goal
of the remainder of this paper.
A second crucial insight conveyed by the decision criterion in
Eq. (1) is that one decides not only based on one’s beliefs, but also
based on personal evaluations of the undesirability of decisions con-
sequences. More precisely, one’s beliefs given all the information
available at the time when the decision needs to be made have to
be related to one’s quantiﬁcations of inconvenience (or, remorse)
associated with adverse decision outcomes. An important corollary
of this is that any probabilistic threshold to which a decision-maker
adheres when making a decision, reveals a particular expression of
preferences among decision outcomes. This is a key property that
will be exploited and discussed in Section 3.
Note further that the criterion Eq. (1) involves the term ‘Bayesian’.
The reason for this is that the state of belief at the timewhen the deci-
sion needs to be made is conditioned on all available information. In
a fully formalised perspective, such a belief state corresponds to pos-
terior probabilities obtained through a Bayesian inference process.
Strictly speaking, thus, the probabilities Pr(h | I) in Eq. (1) are actu-
ally posterior probabilities Pr(h | I, E), where E denotes the available
scientiﬁc evidence. Section 3 will illustrate this through examples.
3. Analysis of examples of forensic decision criteria
3.1. Kinship analysis: paternity
A common example of a legal application involving an explicit
numerical decision criterion is kinship analyses, in particular where
paternity is alleged. Kinship analyses are widely used in civil cases,
but also in criminal cases that may revolve around rape, incest or
unidentiﬁed victims of homicides. In a wider sense, victim identiﬁ-
cation after disasters, or war crimes, is also among the relevant areas
of application.
Suppose a speciﬁc male is alleged to be the father of a spe-
ciﬁc child. Results are available in terms of measurements taken on
genetic markers for the mother, the putative father and the child.
In such a case, scientists report a likelihood ratio (also referred to
as paternity index [e.g., [13]]) for the proposition that the putative
father is the true father, versus the proposition that an unknown per-
son is the father. In addition to a paternity index, scientists may also
report the posterior probability for paternity, along with a statement
of the assumed prior probability of paternity [13,22]. In some juris-
dictions, legal decision-making is based on such a posterior probabil-
ity. In Switzerland, for example, legal practice follows jurisprudence4
according to which paternity is considered ‘practically proven’ if the
probability of paternity is at least 0.998 (starting from prior odds of
1). Similar thresholds are applied in many other jurisdictions and
kinship scenarios (e.g., in immigration cases). The example below
displays such probabilistic thresholds in decision-theoretic terms.
Example 1. What does it mean for a legal decision-maker to say –
in terms of quantiﬁcation of inconvenience associated with adverse
decision outcomes – that paternity is established when the prob-
ability of paternity Pr(h1 | I, E) is, say, at least 0.998? To answer
4 BGE 101 II 13 (Arreˆt de la IIe Cour civile du 15 mai 1975 dans la cause C. contre F.).
this question, invoke relation Eq. (1) and associate h1 and h2 with
the propositions of, respectively, fatherhood and nonfatherhood, to
obtain the ratio 0.998/0.002 = 499. This ratio must exceed the loss
ratio L(C12)/L(C21), where C12 refers to the wrong decision of pater-
nity (i.e., the putative father is not the biological father), and C21 is
the conclusion of not declaring paternity when the putative father
is in fact the father of the child. The Bayesian decision criterion for
a probability threshold of 0.998 thus means:
Decide paternity if and only if:
• wrongly deciding paternity is less than 499 times worse than
wrongly concluding non-paternity;
• or, equivalently, the loss assigned to an erroneous decision
of paternity is smaller than 499 times the loss of an erroneous
decision of non-paternity.
As may be seen, what is important in the comparison with the
odds for the propositions is the magnitude of the loss ratio, not the
absolute loss values assigned to the adverse consequences. Notwith-
standing, for the sole purpose of illustrating a numerical example,
consider the common 0–1 loss scale. If one considers a wrong con-
clusion of paternity (to declare paternity when the alleged father is
not the biological father), C12, to be the worst consequence, it would
receive the maximum loss 1. Then, the loss for a wrong conclusion of
non-paternity, consequence C21, must be greater than 1 over 499.
It is often useful to illustrate the critical loss ratio for differ-
ent threshold probabilities. When the posterior probabilities are,
for example, Pr(h1 | I, E) = {0.95, 0.98, 0.99, 0.995, 0.999} the loss
ratio must be inferior to {19, 49, 99, 199, 999} in order for d1 to be
preferable to d2.
An example for the 95% threshold can be found in the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules Rule 4518(d), which states that if “(. . . )
a genetic marker test or DNA test (. . . ) indicates at least a ninety-
ﬁve percent probability of paternity, the admission of such record
or report shall create a rebuttable presumption of paternity, and
shall, if unrebutted, establish the paternity of and liability for the
support of a child (. . . ).” Considering this decision threshold from a
Bayesian decision-theoretic viewpoint thus means that deciding in
favour of paternity at a probability of 0.95 is warranted if the loss
ratio does not exceed 19. It is worth noting, however, that losses
incurred by quite different people are involved here. Further, the loss
assessment is the assessment of still a third person who is valuing
how “society” is valuing these two different types of losses. This is a
complex structure that is important to recognise.
It is important to remind that results of DNA analyses represent,
usually, only one item of information, among others, that a decision-
maker takes into account. This may lead to situations in which a
court may not decide in favour of paternity even though the proba-
bility of paternity reaches a value well above, for instance, 0.99. An
example for this is the case City & County of San Francisco v. Givens,
85 Cal.App.4th 51, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 859 (Cal.Ct.App.2000). In this case,
a probability of paternity of 0.9992was found. But despite this ﬁgure,
the court retained the conclusion non-paternity after taking into
account evidence provided by the defendant that was qualiﬁed as
‘clear and convincing’, ascertaining that he had not met the mother
in the relevant period of time. This conclusion is not incoherent or in
conﬂict with the formal analysis presented above, nor does it invali-
date the particular numerical ﬁgure resulting from the DNA analysis.
Instead, what the court appears to have been considering at the time
of making the decision, was a degree of belief taking into account
all the information available, including the evidence presented by
the defendant. The latter was strongly pointing against the hypoth-
esis of paternity, as is clariﬁed by the following statement: ‘The
court thereupon entered an order with its ﬁnding that there was “no
probability” that defendant was the father.’
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3.2. Categorical opinion of identity of source (so-called
source attribution)
An interesting insight from the previous section is that common
probabilistic standards for determining paternity relate to limiting
loss ratios on orders of magnitude that are in the realm of what one
may readily apprehend. For example, decision-makers may ﬁnd it
understandable that they ought to take an interest in a question of
the kind ‘Is wrongly deciding paternity less than x times worse than
wrongly concluding non-paternity (where x is a number on the order
of several hundred)?’.
This conceptual perspective provides a point of comparison for
other situations in which decisions regarding competing proposi-
tions need to be made, based on the results of forensic examinations.
Areas of interest cover, for example, DNA, ﬁngermarks, toolmarks
and handwriting. In these disciplines, target questions may focus
on the source of trace material, so-called source attributions: for
example, ‘is the person of interest the source of the DNA trace (or,
ﬁngermark, questioned signature, etc.)?’. But forensic practice in
these areas is diverse. As noted by various authors [12,28], ﬁnger-
mark examiners ﬁnd it acceptable to express categorical opinions
regarding the source of ﬁngermarks, whereas DNA analysts would
not generally do so for biological traces, despite the fact that sta-
tistically more extensive data is available regarding DNA. But even
in the area of DNA, intentions and arguments are diverging. In the
late 1990’s, for example, the FBI followed a policy that allowed
scientists to report in terms of categorical conclusions that partic-
ular trace material came from a particular person, if the rarity of
the DNA proﬁle in the relevant population satisﬁes certain crite-
ria [15]; recently reiterated in [20]. This can be seen as an instance
of the more general – but ﬂawed – argument according to which a
low or very low probability for the event of encountering a given
ﬁnding in another person (or object) from the relevant population
entitles one to ‘jump’ to the conclusion that such an observation
is actually impossible, and hence claim that a given state of nature
(e.g., common source) is proved.5 However, on a strict probabilis-
tic account, a sound expression of an opinion about a proposition
requires more than the DNA ﬁndings alone [3,4]. Moreover, some
authors argue that all direct expressions of opinions, by scientists,
on questions (i.e., propositions) to which the ﬁndings relate are
inappropriate [25].
Despite the above observations on the scope of expert report-
ing, decisions will, at some point, be taken by participants of the
legal process. The current analysis and discussion in this paper
focuses solely on the logical considerations underlying such deci-
sions, regardless of who will actually make those decisions and
whether the formal theory acceptably describes their perception of
the decision problem. One way to formulate the generic question
in matters concerning source attributions is: ‘What is the minimum
degree of probability to be required for accepting the proposition of
common source as established?’ As an aside, note that from a logi-
cal point of view this is equivalent to questions asked in relation to
the standard of proof in civil and criminal cases, an area in which
decades of psychological research has demonstrated a broad variabil-
ity in what subjects consider as the “preponderance” and “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard [14].
Example 2. To illustrate the Bayesian decision-theoretic justiﬁca-
tion of categorical source attribution conclusions, consider a case
in which the conditional genotype probability (CGP) of the single
5 See also Ref. [8] for a mathematical argument, based on a proper scoring rule, that
rounding off small probabilities to 0 (or high probabilities to 1) is not optimal.
proﬁle of a crime stain is on the order of 1 in a billion (10−9).6,7
Imagine further that a person is found to have the same DNA proﬁle
as that of the crime stain. On what considerations would it be
warranted – from a purely logical point of view – to consider this per-
son to be the source of the crime stain?8 Following the framework
outlined in Section 2, there are two steps to answer this question.
The ﬁrst step focuses on ﬁnding the decision-maker’s posterior odds.
These are obtained by combining the prior odds with the likelihood
ratio. In the case here, suppose that the likelihood ratio is given by
1 over the CGP, that is a billion (a log10(LR) of 9). The logarithm
to the base ten (log10) is used here to deal more easily with very
small and large numbers, and to take advantage of the fact that prior
odds and the likelihood ratio combine by addition, rather than mul-
tiplication [1]. The prior odds express the degree of belief before
considering the information regarding the corresponding DNA pro-
ﬁles. We shall consider the situation variously, under three different
suppositions of log10(prior odds) at levels of 0, −3, and −6. Next,
assign the likelihood ratio as 1 over the CGP, that is a billion. The
combination of the prior odds and the likelihood ratio thus leads to
the following log10 posterior odds: {9, 6, 3}. The second step amounts
to comparing the latter result with the loss ratio. According to Eq. (1),
deciding in favour of h1, that is the person of interest being the source
of the crime stain, rather than h2, someone else being the source of
the crime stain, is warranted if and only if:
log10(prior odds) + log10(LR) > log10(loss ratio)
{0,−3,−6} +9 > log10(loss ratio)
{9, 6, 3} > log10(loss ratio)
where the loss ratio is given by the loss of a false source attribution
divided by the loss of a missed source attribution. It is interesting to
note that with prior odds largely in favour of the proposition accord-
ing to which an unknown person is the source of the crime stain (e.g.,
log10 prior odds −6), the posterior odds in favour of the proposition
of common source is a thousand, which might be seen as insuﬃcient
to feel comfortable with concluding common source. However, in
the Bayesian decision-theoretic account concluding common source
with posterior odds of a thousand is only unwarranted if the loss
ratio is larger than this value. Whether this is the case is a judgment
in the realm of the individual decision-maker, though practitioners
might object that they cannot apprehend the target values and their
orders of magnitude. The diﬃculty here may be thinking about the
problem in isolated terms, rather thanwith respect to a point of com-
parison. To help decision-makers make up their minds, and give the
problem more structure, it may thus be instructive to remind them
that in kinship analysis cases, decisions in favour of paternity may be
reached for posterior odds that are only approximately half as large
(e.g., 499 in Example 1).
Example 3. In forensic handwriting examination it often occurs
that the scientist is asked, after comparing questioned writings and
known items of writing from a person of interest, whether or not the
person of interest is the author of the questioned handwritten text.
It is often expected that handwriting examiners are in a position to
6 Note that current proﬁling systems allow one to obtain ﬁgures that are smaller
than 10−9 by several orders of magnitude [16], though reporting should be limited
to 1 in a billion for several reasons, including limitations in empirical support, the
feasibility of real life comparisons (which need to suppose the presence of relatives
in large populations) and diﬃculties to conceptualize extremely small numbers. The
probability of error is a further limiting factor that is usually not taken into account
[e.g., 30].
7 By analogy, the example here can also be given for ﬁngermarks, replacing single
proﬁle by friction ridge minutiae conﬁguration and crime stain by ﬁngermark.
8 For related discussion regarding the uniqueness of DNA proﬁles, see also Ref. [3].
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provide such an opinion because the nature of the examined mate-
rial, handwriting features, is intricate, and only specialist knowledge
that relies exclusively with the scientist would allow one to arrive
at reliable conclusions. However, in forensic handwriting examina-
tion, too, the issue of identity of source crucially depends on the prior
odds, and these lie beyond the area of competence of the handwriting
examiner. So, rather than providing a statement about the proba-
bility of a proposition, given the ﬁndings, handwriting examiners
have turned their attention to expressing a probability for the ﬁnd-
ings, given the competing propositions, to offer guidance in terms of
a likelihood ratio [27].9 In handwriting examinations though, like-
lihood ratios tend to be much smaller than the ﬁgure of a billion
discussed in Example 2 for DNA [21]. For the purpose of illustration,
suppose that the scientist reports a likelihood ratio of a thousand
(log10(LR) of 3). Some forensic scientists illustrate the impact of this
result on different prior odds that the recipients of expert informa-
tion may have, such as log10(prior odds) = {0,−2,−3}. Resulting
posterior odds (log10) would thus be {3, 1, 0}. In this scheme, the sci-
entist is helping the recipient of expert information revising their
beliefs in the truth or otherwise of the proposition that the per-
son of interest, rather than an unknown person, is the author of the
questioned material. But this is still meeting the initial request only
halfway, because the question in the ﬁrst place was whether or not
the person of interest is the author of the questioned handwritten
text. This is a question of decision, for which the scientist may offer
guidance by explaining that a rational choice requires the recipient
of expert information to compare their posterior odds with their loss
ratio. For example, for a likelihood ratio of a thousand, the scientist
may think of reporting along the following lines:
‘My ﬁndings are on the order of one thousand times more prob-
able if the person of interest is the author of the questioned text
than if an unknown person wrote the questioned text. Hence,
whatever odds the recipient of expert information assesses that
the person of interest is the author, based on other evidence, my
ﬁndings multiply those odds by one thousand. For example, if
the prior odds are even, then the posterior odds are one thou-
sand, but will be less for smaller prior odds. To conclude that
the person of interest is the author in the light of these odds
of thousand, the ratio of the losses of adverse decision conse-
quences must be smaller than one thousand. Speciﬁcally, falsely
identifying the person of interest as the author of the questioned
handwritten text must not be assessed as being more than one
thousand times worse thanwronglymissing to recognise the per-
son of interest as the author of the questioned text. If the loss ratio
is actually greater than one thousand, then the rational decision
in this case is not to attribute the questioned text to the person
of interest, despite the odds being in favour of this proposition.
This happens if the prior odds are, for example, 100 or 1000 in
favour of the alternative proposition (i.e., an unknown person is
the author). In the latter situations, the posterior odds in favour
of the proposition that the person of interest is the author of the
questioned text are reduced to, respectively, 10 and 1, and hence
clearly smaller than the loss ratio of one thousand.’
As noted throughout the previous examples, the importance of
the analysis relies in the comparison with the loss ratio. Deciding
9 For a contrary example, see terminology recommended by the Scientiﬁc Working
Group for Forensic Document Examination (SWGDOC). Paragraph 4.1 of the SWGDOC
Standard Terminology for Expressing Conclusions of Forensic Document Examiners
(vers. 2013-2) speciﬁes the following: “identiﬁcation (deﬁnite conclusion of identity)
— this is the highest degree of conﬁdence expressed by document examiners in hand-
writing comparisons. The examiner has no reservations whatever (. . . ) the examiner is
certain, based on evidence contained in the handwriting, that the writer of the known
material actually wrote the writing in question.” (Section 4.1).
in favour of the proposition of common source is only warranted
as long as the odds in favour of this proposition outweigh the ratio
of the losses associated with adverse decision consequences. This
does not mean that the odds in favour of the proposition of common
source must necessarily be high. To illustrate this, consider the well
known particular situation in which it is considered that wrongly
identifying the person of interest as the author of the questioned sig-
nature is as undesirable as wrongly missing to identify the person
of interest as the author. In this case the loss ratio is one and hence
deciding in favour of the proposition of common source would be
warranted as soon as the probability of this proposition exceeds 0.5.
This value is sometimes referred to as a translation of the concept of
preponderance standard [e.g., [18]].
4. Discussion and conclusions
A main question that arises with forensic results in the legal
process is how to revise one’s beliefs in competing propositions of
interest. Besides the ultimate issue, propositions can be of various
kinds and refer to, for example, the source of forensic traces (e.g.,
marks or particles) or alleged activities of persons of interest. Legal
reasoning, especially the question of what to believe given newly
acquired information, is extensively dealt with in both specialised
legal [24] and forensic science literature [1,23]. At some point, how-
ever, participants of the legal process need to act upon their beliefs,
and the question of interest shifts from ‘what to believe’ to ‘what
(or, how) to decide’. These questions of decision do not arise in isola-
tion, but are related to questions of belief. Indeed, practitioners often
ask ‘how sure’ they ought to be before making a particular decision.
It is of interest, thus, to deal with inference and decision within a
coherent whole and to make the connection between these two top-
ics explicit. Bayesian decision theory provides one such framework,
and the fact that the probability part of this theory is already used for
many forensic inference analyses renders it well suited for extend-
ing its use to formal analyses of decision-making. This theoretical
framework is analytical and normative, rather than descriptive, in
the sense discussed further below [9].
The perspective taken in this paper is that of an individual
decision-maker facing a choice among courses of action with uncer-
tainty about decision outcomes. The focus of attention is the question
of what constitutes a good decision, to be deﬁned in terms of par-
ticular criteria – so-called normative standards – by which decision-
making ought to be evaluated [5]. The normative account is valuable
in this respect because it allows one to state precisely what it means
to make a decision in a particular state of uncertainty. This account
provides a reference point against which the observable behavior of
real decision-makers, or their thinking beforemaking a decision,may
be compared. Such behaviour is, in fact, highly variable, depending
on a many situational factors and decision-makers’ characteristics.
This is evidenced in descriptive research of decision behaviour in
legal contexts, such as studies of direct ratings of standards of proof
(see [e.g., Ref. [14]] for a review). Such empirical evidence of diver-
sity in opinion is not necessarily problematic, but it is clear that
the purely descriptive account leaves deeper and more fundamen-
tal issues unaddressed. Examples are, ‘what are the fundamental
properties of the decisions we make, both in every day and profes-
sional situations?’, ‘how can we better understand current decision
practices in terms of their quality (or, ‘goodness’)?’, and ‘how can
we improve decision literacy both as individuals and as a scientiﬁc
community?’. Bayesian decision theory, understood in a normative
sense, provides a conceptual framework to help address these ques-
tions in an analytical sense. In this paper, we have only focused
on the normative perspective, though we understand this perspec-
tive in a broader sense, alongside other perspectives. These include
the mainly empirical and descriptive approaches (i.e., the study of
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observable decision behaviour), and prescriptive perspectives (i.e.,
focusing on how to improve decision behaviour).
To further illustrate the value of the normative approach to
decision-making, imagine a forensic science or law student, or a
young practitioner who newly enters legal practice. How should
they become proﬁcient in sound decision-making? Some commenta-
tors hold that proﬁciency comes through experience, but this offers
no solution for the acquiring of knowledge and understanding of
decision logic principles — which are independent of empiricism.
This pairs with the observation that discussants may refrain from
a discourse that focuses on a formal analysis of the kind presented
in this paper. As a consequence, decision-making remains obscure
and inaccessible to critical review. It is questionable if current practi-
tioners and future generations of members of the judiciary can draw
any constructive input from this state-of-the-art. An open-minded
approach to the normative perspective offers an alternative to this,
in several respects. For one, it is constructive because it comes with
modern decision support systems [29] that ease practical applica-
tions and that help users get acquainted with the underlying logic of
reasoning. Further, it is operational in the sense that it provides the
conceptual framework within which real problems may be analysed
in a rigorous and coherent way. This provides insight for individ-
ual decision-makers which, in turn, is an important preliminary for
individual decisions to be explained, justiﬁed and conveyed between
participants of the legal process. This should contribute to increase
decision literacy among forensic and legal practitioners.
A further key feature of the normative approach to decision is
its uncompromising transparency. This is relevant in a context in
which traditional discussions on standards of proof in terms of single
numerical values appear to be without solution, for reasons men-
tioned above (see also [14]). We have exempliﬁed in this paper that
commonly used decision thresholds, despite their arbitrary appear-
ance, have a clearly deﬁned meaning in their Bayesian decision-
theoretic (re-)formulation. We have emphasized, for example, that
such thresholds are already used in current practice (e.g., in disputed
kinship cases), though not formulated explicitly with terminology
from Bayesian decision theory. We have also argued that this under-
lying decision logic provides fundamental insight for other decision
problems across forensic disciplines. Practically, this means that dis-
cussions can avoid controversial arguments that are prone to lead
to impasses. A typical example for a recurrent controversial argu-
ment is the minimum degree of personal probability required before
making a decision. Instead, discussions could emphasize decision-
makers’ preferences among decision outcomes that the acceptance of
a particular decision threshold inevitably entails. It will then become
possible to have an open discourse on how those preferences ought
to be framed, depending on the features of the case at hand. The cru-
cial take-homemessage from this is that any decision in the light of a
particular state of belief can be reconstructed in terms of the formal
theory emphasized in this paper. This means that, stated otherwise,
that our choices reveal our preferences, independently of whether
one endorses the theory or not.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by the Swiss National Science
Foundation through Grant No. BSSGI0_155809 and the University
of Lausanne. Alex Biedermann gratefully acknowledges the com-
ments received from Professor George F. Sensabaugh and Dr. Charles
Brenner during a visiting research stay at University of California,
Berkeley.
Appendix A. Bayesian decision criterion
Suppose a case in which the issue is whether a ﬁngermark comes
from a given person of interest (POI), or from some unknown person.
Let these two competing versions be the relevant states of nature,
denoted h1 and h2. Further, the decision-maker holds probabilities
Pr(h1 | I) and Pr(h2 | I) for these states of nature, conditioned on the
information I. In a more general view, it is also common to regard
h1 and h2 as the cases of the prosecution and the defense, respec-
tively. Next, let d1 and d2 be the decisions to conclude that the
ﬁngermark comes from, respectively, the POI or from some unknown
person. When deciding di and the state of nature hj holds, conse-
quence Cij arises. The loss associated with the consequence Cij is
written L(Cij). Combining losses and probabilities leads, for each deci-
sion di, to the notion of expected loss EL, deﬁned as follows: EL(di) =∑
jL(Cij) Pr(hj | I). One way to choose among the various decisions
di is to consider their expected loss, and select the decision with
the minimum expected loss. This is known as the principle of mini-
mizing expected loss. Formally, this criterion says that to decide d1
(identifying the POI) rather than d2 (not identifying the POI) if and
only if
L(C11) Pr(h1 | I)+L(C12) Pr(h2 | I) < L(C21) Pr(h1 | I)+L(C22) Pr(h2 | I),
(2)
that is EL(d1) < EL(d2). To simplify this expression, on can invoke a
standard (0, k) loss function, where 0 is the loss assigned to the most
favourable consequence(s), and k is the loss assigned to the least
favourable consequence(s). Here, deciding d1 when proposition h1 is
true (consequence C11), and deciding d2 when proposition h2 is true
(consequence C22), are correct conclusions and have zero losses. The
zero losses L(C11) and L(C22) reduce the expected losses EL(d1) and
EL(d2) in Eq. (2) to, respectively, L(C12)Pr(h2 | I) and L(C21)Pr(h1 | I).
Rewriting Eq. (2) leads to (see also, for example, Ref. [6]):
Pr(h1 | I)




This result shows that, under the chosen type of loss function,
the decision criterion involves the comparison between, on the one
hand, the odds in favour of h1 against h2, and on the other hand,
the ratio of the losses associated with the two adverse decision
consequences.
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